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/Subject (This work analyzes incentive mechanisms designed to encourage carbon sequestration in agriculture in an asymmetric information context. First, the optimal contract under adverse selection is modeled. This model underlines the trade-off between information rents and efficiency. The impacts of finer informational structures, including the costs of identifying more homogeneous agro-ecozones, are then assessed. Finally, the consequences of delegating authority within the principal-agent relationship are investigated.)
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/Title (The economics of carbon sequestration: adverse selection, informational structure and delegation)
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This work analyzes incentive mechanisms designed to encourage carbon sequestration in agriculture in an asymmetric information context. First, the optimal contract under adverse selection is modeled. This model underlines the trade-off between information rents and efficiency. The impacts of finer informational structures, including the costs of identifying more homogeneous agro-ecozones, are then assessed. Finally, the consequences of delegating authority within the principal-agent relationship are investigated.
agriculture abatementcosts carbonsequestration information my_Conference my_publis
bibtex/bibtexkey/CantDeCaJaye05
bibtex/booktitle/{J}ournées de {M}icro-économie {A}ppliquée ({J}{M}{A})
bibtex/number/68
bibtex/url/http://www.fsegt.rnu.tn/fr/data/jma2005/data/Papers/68.pdf
bibtex/keywordsalt2/séquestration du carbone, contrats, sélection adverse, structure informationnelle, délégation
bibtex/keywordsalt1/carbon sequestration, contracts, adverse selection, information structure, delegation
bibtex/address/Hammamet, Tunisia
bibtex/file/CantDeCaJaye05.pdf:CantDeCaJaye05.pdf:PDF
bibtex/owner/stdecara
bibtex/titlealt2/Economie de la séquestration du carbone: sélection adverse, struture d'information et délégation
bibtex/note/Selected paper
bibtex/abstractalt2/Ce papier analyse les méchanismes incitatifs destinés à encourager la séquestration du carbone dans l'agriculture dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le contrat optimal est tout d'abord modélisé dans un contexte de sélection adverse. Le modèle souligne l'arbitrage entre rentes d'information et efficacité. Les effets d'une structure d'information plus fine, tenant compte des coûts associés à l'identification d'agro-écozones, sont ensuite évalués. Enfin, les conséquences de la délégation dans le cadre de la relation principal-agents sont examinées.
bibtex/institution/Journées de Micro-Economie Appliquée
Joan Canton
Stéphane De Cara
Pierre-Alain Jayet
The economics of carbon sequestration: adverse selection, informational structure and delegation
2005-05
application/pdf
Conference
Joan Canton
Stéphane De Cara
Pierre-Alain Jayet
The economics of carbon sequestration: adverse selection, informational structure and delegation
séquestration du carbone, contrats, sélection adverse, structure informationnelle, délégation
carbon sequestration, contracts, adverse selection, information structure, delegation
Hammamet, Tunisia
CantDeCaJaye05.pdf:CantDeCaJaye05.pdf:PDF
stdecara
#may#{{ 26--27}}
2005
Economie de la séquestration du carbone: sélection adverse, struture d'information et délégation
Selected paper
Ce papier analyse les méchanismes incitatifs destinés à encourager la séquestration du carbone dans l'agriculture dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le contrat optimal est tout d'abord modélisé dans un contexte de sélection adverse. Le modèle souligne l'arbitrage entre rentes d'information et efficacité. Les effets d'une structure d'information plus fine, tenant compte des coûts associés à l'identification d'agro-écozones, sont ensuite évalués. Enfin, les conséquences de la délégation dans le cadre de la relation principal-agents sont examinées.
Journées de Micro-Economie Appliquée
Conference
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